Amoral Familism in North Korean Civil Society

By

KIM, Isaac

THESIS

Submitted to

KDI School of Public Policy and Management

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY

2019

Amoral Familism in North Korean Civil Society

By

KIM, Isaac

THESIS

Submitted to

KDI School of Public Policy and Management

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY

2019

Professor Park, Hun Joo

Amoral Familism in North Korean Civil Society

By

KIM, Isaac

THESIS

Submitted to

KDI School of Public Policy and Management

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

For the Degree of

MASTER OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY

Committee in charge:

Professor Park, Hun Joo, Supervisor

Professor Robertson, Jeffrey Scott

Approval as of December, 2019

Acknowledgment

This paper would not have been possible without the guidance of my academic supervisors. I am indebted to Dr. Hun Joo Park and Dr. Jeffrey Robertson as they have been extremely gracious and accessible throughout this entire process. Nobody has been more supportive of me in my pursuit of this degree than the members of my family. I would like to thank my parents as well as my father- and mother-in-law, their prayers and provision have been nothing but extravagant. Of all who gave of themselves for me to finish this work, I would like to thank my beloved wife, Yoonhee, whose patience and encouragement carried me to the finish line. I also want to thank my two adorable daughters, Emma-Joy and Elinor, with whom I hope to visit Korea again soon.

2 Chronicles 7:14.

Soli Deo Gloria.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract

The current state of North Korean studies is overly "securitized." To better assess the multi-faceted problem that is North Korea today, greater attention in non-security areas is warranted. The objective of this paper is to diagnostically investigate the socio-psychological state of the North Korean people and recast the magnitude of the totalitarian realities. The research question is: Does Banfield's (1958) "Amoral Familism" provide a useful framework for characterizing the kind of society that North Korea finds itself to have become today? This study uses simple statistics and a quantitative survey of 1,010 North Korean defectors. T-test results showed that most of the values were statistically significant and analysis of findings provides policy implications for both the defector community in South Korea as well as the future trajectory of the Korean peninsula.

Introduction

A "Securitized" Discourse

North Korean studies is often characterized as a black box where separating truth from fiction is difficult. There are serious limitations to gathering empirical data concerning such a closed society. Even so, using a wide array of indirect data from Western diplomatic sources, testimonies of defectors, material from allies such as the former Soviet Union, and direct experiential knowledge from aid workers traveling to the country, the literature concerning this so-called "hermit kingdom" continues to grow and can no longer be dismissed as *terra incognita*.[1] The extant literature can be organized under a few major themes: the history of North Korean communism and *Juche* ideology; the 1990s famine, marketization and the prospect of reform; human rights violations; the nuclear crisis; and unification strategies. While the increase of international attention and community of "North Korean watchers" is noteworthy, there are also growing concerns around the conceptual incompatibility between English and Korean language conceptualizations of North Korea.[2] Amongst others, the most troubling aspect is that a disproportionate amount of the limelight remains narrowly focused on the nuclear crisis and a subset of topics in security studies, such as Cold War-inspired security dilemma models, game theory calculations, and the wearily familiar debate between engagement approaches of "hawks v. doves."[3] This is problematic on many levels. Important dimensions of the broader

---

[1] Daniel Schwekendiek, *Statistical Explorations In Terra Incognita: How Reliable Are North Korean Survey Data?* (Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2010).
[2] Jeffrey Robertson, *Is Pyongyang Different in Washington and Seoul? English and Korean Language Policy Discourse on North Korea.* (KEIA, 2019).
[3] Aidan Foster-Carter. *Review of Reconstituting Korean Security: A Policy Primer, by Hazel Smith.* (Pacific Affairs, 2009) Vol. 82, No. 3.

North Korean problem such as its economy, civil society, and national identity get sidelined by symptomatic readings that result in shortsighted discussions around technical solutions and reactive policies. To make matters worse, military-based assumptions and "securitized" paradigms spill over into the interpretation of non-security matters, thereby further amplifying the echo chamber of clichés and caricatures that fail to represent the multi-dimensional challenge that is North Korea (Smith, 2000, 112; Ryang, 2009; Lankov, 2013; Schulte, 2010).

Unexamined Area in North Korean Human Security

To break away from the lure of "securitization" and inch closer towards a more comprehensive reading of the North Korean problem, the lens of inquiry must be broadened to include a diagnostic bottom-up framework in which human-security conditions of the North Korean people are examined, in contrast to traditional security studies that focus solely on state behavior.[4] This is particularly relevant considering the non-security challenges that might result after North Korea's political collapse.[5] Beyond the concerns of eliminating weapons of mass destruction, sustaining nonproliferation, and controlling for a stable regime transition, managing the aftermath of these events towards a successful trajectory of development for North Korea may turn out to be an equally complex or far greater challenge (Park, 2014)." Bennett predicts

[4] Seminal human-security contributions address at least 1 of the 7 fundamental components identified in UNDP's Human Development Report 1994: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security, etc. (Scarlatoiu, 2015).

[5] Jeffrey Robertson, *North Korea and Non-traditional Security Challenges.* (Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security Section, 20 July 2009) Research Paper no. 2 2009–10.

that ill-advised policies and poor management of regime collapse would lead to significant humanitarian risks that further debilitate state services, causing ordinary citizens to be displaced in search of food and safety, and triggering what may prove to be an even worse humanitarian crisis than the 1990s famine (Bennett, 2013). Furthermore, millions of North Koreans are still reported to be enduring both physiological and pathological consequences from the calamity that was the 1990s famine, not to mention, all the crimes of "extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions, and other sexual violence" that continue to exacerbate the severe "pain and disfigurement" experienced by the people of North Korea today (Natsios, 2001).[6] While many have started the work of forecasting post-regime collapse scenarios, few have examined the deeper questions regarding the socio-psychological state of the North Korean people who will one day surely emerge out of the shadows of more than 75 years of totalitarian rule.[7] There are existing works that examine pathological repercussions on North Korean refugees from a clinical perspective; however, these studies do not assess the weakening impact on socio-psychological elements such as reciprocity, mutual trust, civic-mindedness, and social capital. This area of study is not only required to accurately diagnose the North Korean problem and but to make appropriate preparations now to mitigate the aforementioned risks.

---

[6] UN COI. (2014). *Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.* United Nations General Assembly Human Rights Council.

[7] While there is a growing literature on examining levels of PTSD amongst North Korean defectors, no attempts have been made to assess the magnitude of totalitarian realities in terms of its impact on shaping the socio-psychological challenges in North Korean society.

Research Question

In his seminal work, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (1958), Edward Banfield provides a highly useful framework for recasting the North Korean problem from the vantage point of a society's socio-psychological ethos. The self-interested society of "amoral familists" that Banfield observes in Southern Italy may powerfully characterize the kind of society that North Korea finds itself to have become today. Banfield argues that the underdevelopment and moral "backwardness" in the amoral familistic society stems "largely" – albeit not entirely – from "the inability of the villagers to act together for their common good or… for any end transcending the immediate interest of the nuclear family (Banfield, 1958). "

This research aims to answer the question: Does Banfield's theory of "amoral familism" provide a useful framework for characterizing the kind of society that North Korea finds itself to have become today? In so doing, this paper aims to offer new insights into levels of social capital and civic-mindedness in North Korea as well as provide recommendations for the policy discourse on future development trajectory, such that it contributes to a more sustainable solution to the North Korean problem. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a summary of Banfield's framework and methodology, along with the theoretical background on corroborating works as well as empirical applications of amoral familism in other case studies. Section 3 outlines this paper's parallel methodology, explaining survey design, limitations, and implementation. Section 4 presents the survey results. Section 5 concludes by way of discussing new policy implications and direction for future research.

Theoretical Background

A Brief Appreciation of Culturalist Theories

Tocqueville's classic work of the sociocultural tradition, *Democracy in America* (1840), was a turning point for the discussion on the role of culture as it pertains to development. When the young French philosopher visited the United States, he observed the vitality of American democracy and attributed the success of such political developments to the "mores" and "associational activism" of its people. Tocqueville posited that "the science of association is the mother of science" and that "the progress of all the rest depends upon the progress it has made" (Tocqueville 1840, 596). While proponents of the *homo economicus* image of development staunchly oppose such a claim, theories placing the weight of explanation on culture or "ethos" have contributed to the improved understanding of how societies organize themselves and develop (Sumner, 1907). In his less cited yet equally seminal work, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments,* Smith explains how the impetus of self-interest and "fellow feeling" are not to be misconstrued as mutually exclusive, but rather complementary in shaping an "enlightened self-interest" conducive to fostering social relations, preserving the sanctity of the market, and ultimately engendering uninterrupted progress. Likewise, Weber (1905) argues that self-interested behavior cannot be understood in isolation from "systems of meaning" or an ethos that inform the way actors pursue their self-interest.

Banfield's Amoral Familism

Banfield (1958) observes the lack of civic cooperation and interpersonal trust in "Montegrano," a small and then underdeveloped village in the province of Potenza in southern Italy.[8] Banfield's research is predicated on the notion that while it is not difficult to observe culture as a limiting factor for determining levels of civic cooperation and therefore of progress, it is not obvious what precise incompatibilities exist between specific aspects of culture and forms of cooperation. Banfield claims that his impressions of the villagers' behavior can be made intelligible by a hypothesis that will prove useful for predicting how Montegranesi will act in concrete circumstances. The hypothesis is that the Montegranesi act *as if* they were following the rule of amoral familism: 'Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that all others will do likewise'" (Banfield 1958, 85). In Banfield's own words, for this hypothesis to be useful, "it need only be shown that they act as if they follow the rule, not necessarily requiring that the people consciously behave in the way described" (Banfield 1958, 85). That is, the coincidence of the survey results and theory does not necessarily "prove" anything, but it does demonstrate that the theory is useful for characterizing (in the sense of making intelligible and predictable) the behavior of the people in that society. To test his *as if* hypothesis, Banfield uses a psychological assessment tool – the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) – to obtain a systematic gauge of the people's socio-psychological state and examine for indicators of low social capital based on seminal definitions established by Hanifan (1916).[9] The

[8] Montegrano is the fictitious name used by Banfield to protect the original town of Chiaromonte.
[9] Hanifan's conceptualization of social capital theory is not attributed to "personal property or to cold cash, but rather to that in life which tends to make this tangible substances count for most in the daily lives of people, namely, goodwill, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among a group of individuals who make up a social unit…" (Hanifan, 1916).

evidence he gathered from the experiment included the absence of social clubs, churches, or local newspapers, a strong central administration of the local authorities, the poor condition of the public schools and unstable voting at political elections, all of which were consistent with his predictive hypothesis of what a society of amoral familist would look like – a cultural obstacle manifested in the inability of villagers to act together for their common good or any end transcending the immediate, material interest of the nuclear family.[10]

Amoral Familism in Other Societies

Beyond the North-South disparity in Italy, many have found Banfield's framework to be useful for characterizing other societies in the Mediterranean region, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Asia. In his anthropological study of Malta, Boissevain shows how a concentrated form of amoral familism exists in the country's political culture, where the members of the political classes, backed by global capital, are effectively consuming the precious natural and cultural assets belonging to the majority of the population that constitute the essential basis for an economy highly dependent on tourism (Boissevain, 2013). Citing Banfield explicitly in his explanation of Malta's cultural identity, Boissevain provides examples of how individuals operate by a cultural norm where actions are justified so long as they benefit the individual or his clan.

Lipset and Lenz (2000) identified corruption – "obtaining wealth or power through illegal practices, providing someone with personal gain at the public's expense" – as the most

[10] Banfield attributes this amoral ethos to a combination of three factors: A high death rate and fear of premature death (socio-economic), constraints of certain land tenure conditions (historical), and the absence of extended family (cultural).

notable expression of amoral familism in Islamic societies. Due to their religious emphasis on familial attachment and the belief that Muslims are all members of a single community, it is considered normal to prioritize the needs of one's immediate family while maintaining a level of concern for fellow Muslims outside of the nuclear family. Despite such communitarian values that promote an ethos of caring for those of the same Islamic faith, the control of resources by a few is heightened when a society is absent of democracy. Lipset and Lenz cite Banfield to characterize such political corruption:

> Since they are responsible for allocating these resources, yet providing support for their relatives, these elites practice corruption. It can be argued, however, that the liberalizing economic reforms may promote democracy, rational values, and self-expression values, which will reduce the "amoral familism" in Islamic countries. Amoral familism opposes rational and self-expression values. The reduction in amoral familism will lower corruption levels. Still, because of the hierarchical and traditional power in these countries, access to resources are monopolized by the elites in the ruling class, and corruption remains high.

Once again, we see in these examples that development in terms of Amartya Sen's "increased capacity for freedom" is not merely determined by access to resources but largely influenced by the cultural factors that either serve as an impetus or impediment to development.

Alesina and Giuliano corroborate Banfield's theory in their extensive study of Asian societies and argue that an inverse relationship exists between family ties and political participation, such that the more individuals rely on the family (exclusively) as a provider of "services, insurance, and transfer of resources," the lower is one's political participation (Alesnia and Giuliano, 2011). Lee and Hsiao also make a similar argument in their seminal work,

Familism, Social Capital and Civic Culture: A Multifaceted Test of Survey Data in Eleven Asian Societies (Lee and Hsiao, 2010). Their findings affirm the notion that familism and social capital are intuitively antithetical, claiming that a kin-centered particularism leads to weak voluntary associations, lack of civic-mindedness, and a void of interpersonal and institutional trust (Banfield 1958; Fukuyama 1995; Newton 2007).

The evidence of amoral familism in Southern Italy gets revived by Putnam's prominent work on social capital, *Making Democracy Work (*Putnam, 1993). In his iteration of examining the disparity between Northern and Southern Italy, Putnam makes the parallel case for civic capacity as being the major independent variable for varying levels of political organization and economic development. Putnam's work is particularly significant for applying Banfield's framework in assessing the underdevelopment in post-Communist economies. To this end he writes:

> The fate of Mezzogiorno is an object lesson for the Third World today and the former Communist lands of Eurasia tomorrow, moving uncertainly towards self-government… For political stability, government effectiveness, and even for economic progress, social capital may be even more important than physical or human capital… Many of the formerly Communist societies had weak civic traditions before Communism, and totalitarian rule abused even that limited stock of social capital. Without norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement, the Hobbesian outcome of the Mezzogiorno – amoral familism, clientelism, lawlessness, ineffective government, and economic stagnation – seems likelier than successful democratization and economic

development. Palermo may represent the future of Moscow.[11]

Putnam argues that people who live under an authoritarian government are trapped in amoral familism and tend to lack civic-mindedness as a consequence: “Force and family provide a primitive substitute for the civic community” (Putnam 1993, 178).

This paper attempts to improve the existing literature in two ways. First, we use a set of diagnostic questions that apply Banfield’s predictive hypothesis to test whether North Koreans behave “as if” they are following the rule of amoral familism in concrete circumstances. Second, this research uses a survey that has a significantly larger sample size than most survey-based studies on North Korea.

[11] Putnam 1993, 183.

Methodology

Data Acquisition

This study was done using survey data collected from 1,010 North Korea defectors living in South Korea. The survey was carried out by the Korea Development Institute in partnership with the Nielsen Company throughout 7 weeks from June 7th to July 24th, 2016. The content of the survey consisted of 9 different sets of questions addressing a range of topics (i.e. social capital in North and South Korea, economic activity, family life, education, defection experiences, life in South Korea, media usage, etc.) of which 1 set (total of 14 questions) was designated for this present paper. The survey was conducted via the CAPI (Computer Assisted Personal Interview) method along with in-person interviews, both on an individual and group level so that interviewees were encouraged to answer structured questionnaires as well as freely sharing their personal experience through open-ended interviews. With a relatively larger sample size, the survey had a confidence level of 95% and a confidence interval of ±3%.

Due to the risk associated with participating in a survey and publicly disclosing information regarding their lives in North Korea, the personal safety of respondents was considered the highest priority throughout the process of recruiting participants. Thus, to maintain confidentiality, the most realistic method of recruitment was through "snowball sampling" (or chain sampling), whereby the network of existing study subjects was leveraged to recruit new subjects via referrals among their acquaintances of fellow defectors.

Survey Population and Sample Stratification

For this study, we limited the survey population to those who had firsthand experiences of living through the changes that took place as a result of the Economic Adjustment Policy launched on July 1, 2002 (see Table 1).[12] Thus, the selection of our survey population and sample was limited to defectors whose records of entry to South Korea was after 2003 (Table 3). In terms of stratification, the survey population was stratified by the following criteria (Table 2): [1] year of entry to South Korea (2003 to 2007, 2008 to 2012, 2013 and beyond), [2] gender (male and female), and [3] age groups (20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, 60s and over). Table 4 shows the parallel stratification reflected accordingly in the sample of 1,010 participants.

Table 1. Definition and Distribution of Population by Year of Entry to South Korea

	Total	**~'98**	**~'01**	**'02**	**'03**	**'04**	**'05**	**'06**	**'07**	**'08**	**'09**	**'10**	**'11**	**'12**	**'13**	**'14**	**'15**	**'16.3**
Number of Participants	29,137	947	1,043	1,142	1,285	1,898	1,384	2,028	2,554	2,803	2,914	2,402	2,706	1,502	1,514	1,397	1,276	342
Percentage	100.0	3.3	3.6	3.9	4.4	6.5	4.7	7.0	8.8	9.6	10.0	8.2	9.3	5.2	5.2	4.8	4.4	1.2
Definition of Survey Population	-	Not included			Included													

Note. Ministry of Unification, North Korean Defector Entry Report (March 2016)

[12] Hong, Ihk-pyo. A Shift Toward Capitalism? Recent Economic Reforms in North Korea. East Asia Review, vol. 14, Winter 2002. Pp. 93-106.

Table 2. Definition and Distribution of Population by Age

	Total	15-19	20s	30s	40s	50s	60s and over
Percentage	100	4.2	18.8	26.5	31.3	12	7.2
Definition of Survey Population	-	Not included	Included				

Note. Korea Hana Foundation, 2015 Report on North Korean Economic Activity (December 2014)

Table 3. Population and Sample Distribution by Gender and Year of Entry to South Korea

	Current Population (2016)			Sample Distribution		
	Total	**Male**	**Female**	**Total**	**Male**	**Female**
Total	**26,005**	**6,674**	**19,331**	**1,000**	**257**	**743**
2003 - 2007	9,149	2,612	6,537	351	100	251
2008 - 2012	12,327	3,060	9,267	474	118	356
2013 -	4,529	1,002	3,527	175	39	136

Table 4. Definition and Distribution of Sample by Age

	Total	20s	30s	40s	50s	60s and over
Percentages in Population (%)	100	19.6	27.7	32.7	12.5	7.5
Sample Distribution	1000	196	277	327	125	75

Survey Questions

This paper aims to answer the question: Does the "self-interested society of amoral familism" that Banfield observes in Southern Italy explain the kind of society that North Korea finds itself to have become today? Mirroring Banfield's "as if" hypothesis, the intent behind the framing of the survey questions was not to statistically "prove" any correlation or causation, but rather, to simply test the utility of a theory for making intelligible and predicting how North Koreans will act in concrete circumstances. Thus, the hypothesis is that North Koreans act *as if* they are following the rule of amoral familism: "Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that all others will do likewise." In Banfield's own words, for this hypothesis to be useful, "it need only be shown that they act as if they follow the rule, not necessarily requiring that the people consciously behave in the way described" (Banfield 1958, 85). That is, the coincidence of the survey results and theory does not necessarily "prove" the existence of amoral familism in North Korea, but rather, it demonstrates that the theory is useful for characterizing (in the sense of making intelligible and predictable) the behavior of the ordinary citizen in North Korea.

Building mainly on the key hypotheses of Banfield on how an amoral familist society behaves (1958, Chapter 5), the survey questions have been designed to examine to what extent the indicators of amoral familism are present in North Korean society today. Table 5 shows the juxtaposition of a few key examples of Banfield's hypothesis alongside the corresponding survey questions that were informed by those hypotheses to assess the levels of amoral familism within the North Korean context. The full list of survey questions are provided below and Banfield's predictive hypotheses are provided in its entirety in the appendix section.

Table 5. Banfield's Hypothesis and NK Defector Survey Questions

Banfield's Hypothesis	NK Defector Survey Questions
• *In a society of amoral familists, no one will further the interest of the group or community except as it is to his private advantage to do so. People only seek their own welfare and wellbeing of their immediate family.*	• "Have you ever offered help to someone outside of your immediate family defecting North Korea?" • "While living in North Korea, did you make any effort to benefit public organizations or society at large even if it had no direct benefit to you personally?"
• *In a society of amoral familists, only officials will concern themselves with public affairs, for only they are paid to do so. For a private citizen to take a serious interest in a public problem will be regarded as abnormal and even improper.*	• "In North Korea, were you of the mindset that public affairs are strictly the concerns of government officials and that it is inappropriate or abnormal behavior for an ordinary citizen to be seriously interested in such affairs?
• *In a society of amoral familists, the law will be disregarded when there is no reason to fear punishment.*	• "While living in North Korea, were you of the mindset that the law could be disregarded as long as there was no possibility of getting caught?"
• *In a society of amoral familists, officeholders will take bribes when he can get away with it. But whether he takes bribes or not, it will be assumed by the society of amoral familists that he does.*	• "While you were living in North Korea, do you think you would have dealt with bribes if you knew that you would be safe from any punishment from government authorities?"

Survey Questions

1. "Have you ever offered help for someone outside of your immediate family defect from North Korea?"
2. "Have you helped anyone in their defection from North Korea in partnership with an existing NGO or organization that focuses on supporting defectors?

3. While you were living in North Korea, was there anyone that you trusted amongst relatives, neighbors, or social settings outside of your immediate family?"
4. "What types of people did you trust outside of your immediate family during your time in North Korea?"
5. "While you were living in North Korea, were there any work supervisors, a person of senior rank, or overall mentor figures that you respected and held in high esteem?"
6. "What types of people did you respect outside of your immediate family in North Korea?"
7. "What would you have done if you witnessed a relative, neighbor, or stranger outside of your immediate family treated unjustly by the government?"
8. "While living in North Korea, did you make any effort to benefit public organizations or society at large even if it had no direct benefit to you personally?"
9. "In North Korea, were you of the mindset that public affairs are strictly the concerns of government officials and that it is inappropriate or abnormal behavior for an ordinary citizen to be seriously interested or concerned about such affairs?
10. "While living in North Korea, were you of the mindset that the law could be disregarded as long as there was no possibility of getting caught?"
11. "While you were living in North Korea, do you think you would have dealt with bribes if you knew that you would be safe from any punishment from government authorities?"
12. "How often are there business partnerships based on loans and a system of credit in the North Korean market?"
13. "How often do you see business partnerships built on mutual trust in the North Korean market economy?
14. "Do you think mutual trust is the foundation of business partnerships in North Korea?

Results

Does the "self-interested society of amoral familism" that Banfield observes in Southern Italy characterize the kind of society that North Korea finds itself increasingly to have become today? The results from our survey of 1,010 North Korean defectors showed patterns of low social capital and civic-mindedness that substantiate the applicability of Banfield's theory for characterizing the people of North Korea.[13] With that said, there were surprising signs of trust and relational contracting present in the way business partnerships are formed within the informal economy of North Korea. The most relevant results of this study are organized as follows.

The first question: "Have you ever offered help for someone outside of your immediate family defect from North Korea?" was designed to obtain an overall pulse check on sentiments of natural sympathy and civic-mindedness that one might feel towards those undergoing adverse circumstances outside of their immediate nuclear family. Table 4 shows that only a small minority (16.35%) answered positively to ever having had the experience of helping someone in their defection from North Korea and an absolute majority (87.3%) have never offered help to anyone in this regard.

Table 4. Helping non-immediate family members defect from North Korea

	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Yes	165	16.3
No	845	83.7
Total	1010	100.0

[13] *North Korean Defector Survey*, (KDI, Nielsen 2016)

When asked: “Have you helped anyone in their defection from North Korea in partnership with an existing NGO or organization whose mission is to alleviate the plight of defectors?” An overwhelming majority (89.7%) also answered no.

Figure 1 shows that of the 165 individuals who answered positively to helping someone defect, 77 respondents answered to have helped 1 person, 56 respondents answered 2-3 people, and 32 respondents answered to helping 4 or more people. In other words, less than 2% of the 1,010 respondents attest to ever providing help to a fellow defector and of the small minority that has done so, nearly half of them (47%) have experience of helping only 1 person defect from North Korea (mean 1.7).

Figure 1. How many people did you help defect from North Korea?



Other noteworthy patterns of answers to this question include the similarity in the mean of persons helped between the two genders. Considering the difference of male-to-female (1 to 4) ratio in the total number of defectors participating in this survey versus the 1 to 3 male-to-female ratio within the 165 respondents who answered positively to helping others defect, there are slightly more males, proportionately speaking, who assisted someone outside of their immediate

family in their defection. Nonetheless, as shown in Table 5, when accounting for the mean of persons helped in each category (from “1 person” to “4 or more"), the results are relatively equal between males and females, 1.8 and 1.7 persons respectively.

Table 5. Means of the amount of people helped by gender

	Total	1 person	2-3 people	4 or more people	(Mean: persons)
	165	46.7	33.9	19.4	1.7
Male	44	45.5	31.8	22.7	1.8
Female	121	47.1	34.7	18.2	1.7

Note. Of the total participant pool of 1,010 defectors, there were 800 females and 210 males.

Table 6 shows a pattern worth noting when isolating for the variable of party membership (political associations). Respondents who identified as non-party members offered most of their help to extended family at an average of 1.4 persons and offered the least amount of help to strangers at an average of 0.9 persons. By stark contrast; however, those who identified themselves as having party membership provided the most help to strangers at an average of 11.8 persons and significantly less help to extended family at an average of 0.9 persons. Respondents with political associations were more inclined to help strangers outside their immediate family, while those without any political affiliation were more inclined to help one’s extended family.

Table 6. Means of the demographics helped by party membership

	Total	Extended Family	Friend or Colleague	People from same province	Stranger
Party Members	13	.9	2.0	1.6	11.8
Non-party Members	152	1.4	.4	.9	.5

Table 7 shows that 66% (109) of the 165 who provided defection assistance to those outside their immediate family identified as having employment during their time in North Korea. This is noteworthy because the demographic category to which they provided the most assistance was strangers at an average of 2.1 persons. Conversely, for the 56 who were unemployed during their time in North Korea, their level of assistance to strangers was at an average of .0 persons, with the highest demographic category for their assistance having gone to extended family at 1.1 persons.

Table 7. Means of the demographics helped by employment status in North Korea

	Total	Extended Family	Friend or Colleague	People from same province	Stranger
Employed	109	1.5	.5	1.3	2.1
Unemployed	56	1.1	.5	.2	.0

The second set of questions were aimed at assessing levels of generalized trust for people outside of one's immediate nuclear family. Regarding the question: "While you were living in North Korea, was there anyone that you trusted amongst relatives, neighbors, or social

settings outside of your immediate family?" Table 8 shows that 72.6% of respondents answered negatively to having anyone outside of their immediate family that they considered trustworthy.

Table 8. Was there anyone that you trusted outside of your immediate family?

	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Yes	277	27.4
No	733	72.6
Total	1010	100.0

It is also noteworthy to consider the varying results between party members v. non-party members. Among those who identified themselves as party members, 40.8% answered positively to trusting a neighbor or relative outside of their nuclear family, while only 25.9% of non-party members answered positively to the same question. There is also something to be said about respondents who received higher levels of education during their time in North Korea, as those who attended vocational school (140) and university (102) answered positively to the question at 40% and 35% respectively.

Figure 2 shows that out of the 277 respondents who answered positively to trusting neighbors, relatives, and people in general society (Table 8), a majority (62.5%) answered to having trusted only 1 to 2 persons and the mean for all 277 responses was 2.9 persons.

Figure 2. Number of trusted neighbors or relatives by percentage



Figure 3 shows the distribution of answers to a more specific question: "What types of people did you trust outside of your immediate family during your time in North Korea?" Instead of providing a set of preselected answer options, respondents were asked to freely fill out the types of people they trusted outside of their immediate family. Amongst a wide array of answers for people types, the highest category was by far Friends (139.4) and then Relatives (58.8) at a distant second. Other types included Local Neighbors, Work Supervisors/Peers/subordinates, School Seniors/Peers/Juniors, Acquaintance in Provisional People's Committee, School Instructor, Fellow Party Member, Acquaintance in State Political Security, Acquaintance in State Federation, etc. The two highest people categories of Friends and Relatives combined (198.2) exceed the number of people they trusted in all 9 other categories combined (89).

The third set of questions were aimed at assessing levels of respect and admiration for those outside of one's immediate family. Regarding the question: "While you were living in North Korea, were there any work supervisors, a person of senior rank, or overall mentor figures that you respected and held in high esteem?" Table 9 shows that nearly 80% of respondents answered negatively to having anyone that they considered respectable or a mentor figure in their

lives. In other words, of the entire participant sample, only a small minority (20%) of respondents answered positively to having anyone in society that they held in high esteem or considered a role model.

Figure 3. What types of people did you trust outside of your immediate family?



Table 9. "Were there any work supervisors or general mentor figures that you respected?

	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Yes	206	20.4
No	804	79.6
Total	1010	100.0

Additionally, out of the 206 respondents who answered positively (Table 9), a strong majority (79.9%) answered having only 1 to 2 persons that they respected and the mean for all 206 responses was 2.3 persons (Figure 4). Parallel to earlier questions of trust (Table 8), levels of education demonstrated to be significant factors for the questions regarding levels of respect for people outside of one's immediate family. The group with the lowest mean (1.3 persons) were those whose level of education was below elementary school – 0% of this demographic answered to having 4 or more persons that they respected. By contrast, respondents with education levels higher than university had a mean of 2.5 persons. The group with the highest mean of 3.4 persons were those who identified Pyeongyang as their hometown.

Figure 4. How many work supervisors or mentor figures did you respect?



Figure 5 shows the distribution of answers to the question: "What types of people did you respect outside of your immediate family in North Korea?" Rather than providing a list of preselected answer options, respondents were asked to freely fill out the types of people they respected and held in high esteem outside of their immediate family. Amongst a wide array of answers for people types, the highest category was Work Supervisors/Colleagues (60.2), then

School Senior-classmen/Peers (56.3), and then Friends (36.4). Other people types included School Instructors, Local Acquaintances, Party Leaders, State Political Security Officials, Relatives, Acquaintances in Provisional People's Committee, Superiors in Military, Federation or League Acquaintances, Other Acquaintances, and Other.

Figure 5. What types of people did you respect outside of your immediate family?



The next sequence of questions is aimed at testing amoral familistic tendencies in terms of how they would have behaved in concrete circumstances. Figure 6 shows that when confronted with the question: "What would you have done if you witnessed a relative, neighbor, or stranger outside of your immediate family treated unjustly by the government?" Of the total 1,010 respondents, 45% answered despite having a desire to report the wrongdoing, they would keep silent and act as if they never saw the incident out of fear. 41% answered that if the victim is someone outside one's immediate family, they will act as though they never saw it. 13% answered that they would have protested the government for their wrongdoing and 1% answered that they are uncertain what they would have done.

Figure 6. What would you have done if you witnessed a relative, neighbor, or stranger outside of your immediate family treated unjustly by the government?



When asked the question: "While living in North Korea, did you make any effort to benefit public organizations or society at large even if it had no direct benefit to you personally?" Of the total 1,010 respondents, 49% answered 'Yes' and 51% answered 'No. I would not have made any effort unless it was of direct benefit to me.' The nearly equal distribution of answers in this question is rather surprising – we will circle back to this observation in the discussion section. What is also noteworthy is when examining education levels and how their responses vary within the seemingly equal 50/50 split. Figure 8 shows a clear illustration of how levels of education seem to have an inverse relationship with levels of willingness to participate in efforts that benefit civic organizations. 92% of those who had no education answered negatively to making any effort to benefit civic organizations if it meant yielding no direct benefit to oneself. Consistently in the same pattern, levels of unwillingness to benefit civic organizations decreased as levels of education

increased: 63% of those who had elementary education, 53% of those who had a middle school education, 44% of those who attended vocational schools, and 35% of those who received a university-level education.

Figure 7. Did you make any effort to benefit public organizations and society at large even if it had no direct benefit to you?



Figure 8. Civic cooperation by education levels



Table 10 shows the results from the question: “In North Korea, were you of the mindset that public affairs are strictly the concerns of government officials and that it is inappropriate or abnormal behavior for an ordinary citizen to be seriously interested or concerned about such affairs?” This question is aimed at examining how North Koreans generally perceive the realm of public affairs and whether these matters are expected to be in the realm of interest for ordinary citizens. Of the 1,010 respondents, 62.1% answered positively to affirm the notion that it is inappropriate or abnormal for ordinary citizens to be seriously interested in civic affairs. Conversely, 37.9% answered negatively to this perception. In other words, the majority of this participant pool considers public matters to be strictly the concerns of government personnel and not ordinary citizens.

Table 10. “In North Korea, were you of the mindset that public affairs are strictly the concerns of government officials and that it is inappropriate or abnormal behavior for an ordinary citizen to be seriously interested or concerned about such affairs?

	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Yes	627	62.1
No	383	37.9
Total	1010	100.0

Figure 9 shows the results to the question: “While living in North Korea, were you of the mindset that the law could be disregarded as long as there was no possibility of getting caught?” 62% of the respondents selected the answer: ‘If there is no danger of being caught, I have no reason to abide by the law and everyone else will do the same’ while 38% answered: ‘I will abide by the law because it is important to have a law-abiding spirit.’

Figure 9. "While living in North Korea, were you of the mindset that the law could be disregarded as long as there was no possibility of getting caught?



Table 11 shows the results to the question: "While you were living in North Korea, do you think you would have dealt with bribes if you knew that you would be safe from any punishment from government authorities?" Consistent with the results from previous questions of how one's decision-making calculus changes with the removal of any negative consequences, this question also revealed similar levels of self-interested "backwardness" as 79.3% of respondents answered positively to getting involved with bribes if the prospect of getting punished by government authorities was removed. A minority of only 20.7% answered negatively to transacting bribes in the absence of facing consequences with law enforcement.

Table 11. Do you think you would have dealt with bribes if you knew that you would be safe from any punishment from government authorities?

	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Yes	801	79.3
No	209	20.7
Total	1010	100.0

Figure 9 shows a composite of results from two separate questions checking for levels of relational contracting via systems of credit and mutual trust in the existing market economy of North Korea. The first question asks: "How often are there business partnerships based on loans and a system of credit in the North Korean market?" and to what may be the surprise of observers, a substantial portion of the respondents answered positively to seeing business partnerships based on loans and credit (32.5% Very Often, 40.8% Sometimes). Differently put, more than half of the respondents attest to the provisioning of credit and loans as a regularized practice by which business partnerships are formed in North Korea. What is just as noteworthy are the results from the second question: "How often do you see business partnerships built on mutual trust in the North Korean market economy? While only 15.1% answered to seeing mutual trust, 42.8% answered positively that they sometimes see business partnerships built on mutual trust. 29.6% answered 'Not often' and 12.5% answered 'Almost none.'

Figure 10. Relational Contracting and Mutual Trust in NK Market Economy



Table 12 shows the results form the last question: "Do you think mutual trust is the foundation of business partnerships in North Korea?" To which 65.9% respondents answered 'Yes' and 34.1% answered 'No.' This juxtaposition between these results and the perplexing image of a "low-integrity" but "highly-trusting" market economy is further reinforced by the results from

Table 12. Do you think trust is the foundation of business partnerships in North Korea?

	Number of Respondents	Percentage
Yes	666	65.9
No	344	34.1
Total	1010	100.0

Discussion

Findings and Policy Implications

Does the "self-interested society of amoral familism" that Banfield observes in Southern Italy characterize the kind of society that North Korea finds itself to have become today? The results from our survey of 1,010 North Korean defectors showed overall patterns of low social capital and civic-mindedness that substantiate the applicability of Banfield's theory for characterizing the people of North Korea.[14] It was shown that ordinary North Korean citizens had a very low capacity for helping and trusting individuals outside of their nuclear family. A majority of 87.3% said they have never offered help to anyone in this regard and 89.7% answered negatively to providing help in partnership with organizations supporting defectors (Table 4). Some of this may be attributed to the inherent risk and danger involved in the act of defection; especially, since 80% to 90% of defectors in China become victims of human trafficking and those who get caught in the act of defecting are forcibly sent back to North Korea.[15] Nevertheless, the fact that 90% of those who answered negatively to helping other defectors also answered negatively to partnering with any defector-supporting organizations demonstrates an overall unwillingness to act for the good of people outside of their nuclear family. Some correlations were also identified as party membership and employment status suggested a stronger probability for helping strangers. Respondents who had political associations in North Korea had significantly higher

---

[14] *2016 North Korean Defector Survey*: Korea Development Institute, The Nielsen Company.

[15] CRS. 2007. *North Korean refugees in China and human rights issues: International response and US policy options.* Congressional Research Service.

rates of helping strangers and those with employment employed had a mean of helping 2.1 strangers while the unemployed had a mean of 0. In the area of generalized trust, a majority of 72.6% answered that they do not trust anyone outside of their nuclear family and of the ones who answered positively, a majority (62.5%) of them had only 1 to 2 persons that they considered trustworthy. Once again, the variable of party-membership was shown to be positively significant as respondents who had experience of engaging in political associations demonstrated a higher level of trust for others and those without any associations demonstrated a much lower level of trust for people outside of their nuclear family. These correlations show the importance of healthy political associations and the dignity of work as a means for enhancing sentiments of "fellow feeling" and trust in North Korean civil society. North Korean defectors struggle to get acclimated with the capitalistic culture and politics of South Korea today and these disconnects are only exacerbated by the lack of employment opportunities they have in the mainstream economy of their new host country. As with most policy implications for North Korean human security, given that these are difficult solutions to actualize in the pre-regime transition context, the most efficacious application of this would be the work of improving opportunities for political association/representation as well as meaningful employment for the 30,000+ refugees living in South Korea today.

With regards to civic cooperation (Figure 7), it was also shown that 51% of respondents did not make any effort to benefit public organizations in North Korea when it had no direct benefit to them. This is consistent with studies of other ex-totalitarian societies where under conditions of material scarcity, suffering, and famine, the benefits of social cooperation and trust are severely hampered and any significant improvement of an individual was perceived as a threat to

all other individuals, families, and society as a whole (Foster 1965, Popkin 1979). With that said, 49% answered positively to making such efforts of benefiting society and the correlation with education levels provides helpful insights for policy interventions that may prove effective in enhancing public-spiritedness. Figure 8 shows a clear illustration of how levels of education show an inverse relationship with levels of willingness to participate in efforts that benefit civic organizations and society at large. 92% of those who had no education answered negatively to making any effort to benefit civic organizations if it meant yielding no direct benefit to oneself. Consistently in the same pattern, levels of unwillingness to benefit civic organizations decreased as levels of education increased: 63% of those who had elementary education, 53% of those who had a middle school education, 44% of those who attended vocational schools, and 35% of those who received a university-level education. As mentioned earlier, such correlations provide direction for further policy interventions and support in the area of educational opportunities for North Koreans, both now in terms of the defectors in South Korea as well as the society at large in the post-unification context. Based on surveys carried out by Hana Korea Foundation (HKF), North Korean defectors have experienced discrimination, alienation, and suspicion by the people of South Korea. As a result, consistent studies show that North Koreans struggle with various mental health issues such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) which negatively impact not only their resettlement but the ability to maximize educational opportunities. Moreover, due to a lack of knowledge and access to resources regarding mental health – not to mention the heavy stigma against mental health in South Korea's culture – it is extremely challenging for them to receive the help they need, so much that over "70% percent of North Korean refugees responded that they do not, or almost do not, know the roles of counseling centers or psychological

counselors" in a defector survey (Noh, Kwon, Yu, Park, & Woo, 2015). Thus, efforts to provide access to education must be complemented with the provisioning of receptive atmospheres where tailored socio-psychological support is provided through a robust coalition of professionally trained counselors, both of the academic and clinical discipline, to improve educational resilience and thereby civic-mindedness of the defector community in South Korea as well as the future of North Korean civil society.[16]

It is interesting to note that the results from Figure 9 are almost identical to the results from Table 7, suggesting that attitudes towards civic affairs and compliance with the law are viewed in the same light. Separately, one alarming observation is that of employers and business owners, where 77.8% of this demographic answered to having no reason to abide by the law if the possibility of getting caught is eliminated and that they would assume everyone else to behave in the same manner. This has significant implications for issues of business integrity, compliance issues, levels of reciprocity and how the North Korean market economy, albeit nascent and informal, is being developed in terms of its core assumptions and ethics. It is also worth mentioning that while most of the results showed clear indicators of amoral familism, one question yielded responses that initially seemed surprising and even contradictory. It is shown in Figure 10 and Table 12 that a substantial portion of the 1,010 participant sample answered positively to the practice of relational contracting and extension of credit and loans, as well as

[16] In 2010, the Ministry of Unification amended their policy, *North Korean Refugee Protection and Settlement Support* by requiring "professional counselors" for defectors seeking help in over 32 Hana Resettlement Centers to provide mental health services. However, most "professional counselors" are performing many other tasks and only a small number of counselors were registered as mental health providers.

65.9% affirming trust as being the foundation for how business partnerships are done in North Korea. On a surface level, this presents a perplexing contradiction to the amoral familistic disposition seen thus far, where a majority of respondents acknowledged their willingness to violate the law and even transact bribes when the circumstances are convenient and to their advantage (Figure 8 and Table 9). However, on a deeper level, this may suggest a more nuanced reality that illustrates the tension between an ethos of amoral familism with a trust-based (or at least perceived to be trust-based) practices of an informal capitalistic economy that is burgeoning together in the same society.

Limitations

This survey is unique in that it represents the largest sample size among existing surveys of North Korean defectors.[17] With that said, this data set is not perfect and has limitations that are worth noting. First, the sample is not representative of the total population of North Korea. The fact that many of these defectors were entering South Korea as a refugee escaping starvation suggests that they may very well represent the lower social and economic strata of North Korean society. However, concerning the questions relevant to this study, the sample population offers a relatively accurate representation of the "ordinary" North Korean citizen outside of the top 1% elite. Second, questions about participant's experiences and observations of civic engagement in North Korea are based on memory, requiring respondents to rely heavily on their recollection of

[17] The most recent example with a relatively larger defector sample population (700 participants) is Byung-Yeon Kim and Dongho Song, *The Participation of North Korean Households in the Informal Economy: Size, Determinants, and Effect',* Seoul Journal of Economics, Vol. 21, No.2, Summer 2008, pp.361-85.

their lives in North Korea. This is a considerable challenge since most defectors spend 3 to 4 years in China, Russia or other Southeast Asian countries before entering South Korea, which increases the potential of omitting or even distorting information for various reasons that are hard to detect. Third, discerning whether a defector's view of North Korea has consciously or unconsciously exaggerated or shifted as a result of newly acquired knowledge after leaving North Korea is extremely difficult. Finally, there is the issue of objectivity of interpretation since "the politics of interpretation" is practically inevitable in social research, and so this paper was written with conscious efforts to recognize any biases that might be present, minimizing their interference to maximize objectivity in the interpretation of the data. Nonetheless, the lack of access to any official data on North Korean civil society forces the use of such defector surveys and while we do not know how representative our findings are; our impression is that they were highly representative of that part of the population which defected from North Korea in the past 16 years and reasonably representative of those still residing in North Korea.

Conclusion

A vast majority of "North Korean watchers" focus their attention primarily on the country's nuclear dilemma, its military, and other traditional security issues surrounding Pyongyang. While North Korea captures headlines with its aggressive behavior and growing nuclear arsenal, the socio-psychological dilemma of ordinary North Koreans goes largely unnoticed. Few have raised deeper questions to diagnose the type of backward society that may one day unearth itself after more than 75 years of totalitarian rule. If indeed the performance of institutions and the developmental trajectory of a nation is shaped by the cultural context within

which they operate, it would be a fatal miscalculation to ignore much of the iceberg of the North Korean problem that lies beneath the surface of the nuclear deadlock.

Limitations notwithstanding, the findings from this research demonstrate a compelling image of the society of amoral familists that North Korea finds itself to have become today. The socio-psychological obstacles to human trust and civic cooperation in North Korea presents formidable challenges for the long-term prospects of unification. How then can South Korea and the international community best assist ordinary North Koreans to increase their social capital and therefore contribute to a sustainable future of the Korean peninsula? Dedicating independent policy attention to the work of expanding individual freedom and capacity, establishing a just system of public service, providing equitable access to education, preserving religious liberty, enabling meaningful employment, and empowering role models of civic engagement, amongst other priorities, will be instrumental in reforming the ethos of North Korean civil society.

Last but not least, we must recognize how this challenge is exacerbated within the inhospitable culture of South Korean society where 30,000+ defectors struggle to find belonging today. As a host nation of North Korean refugees and a key stakeholder of the future regime transition, South Korea must take concerted action to renounce its own form of "backwardness" and "amoral nationalism" that manifests in a self-preserving interest-driven calculous when it comes to the policy discourse of North Korea and the future of the Korean peninsula. As an ethnically homogenous nation with a short history of immigration and aversion to multiculturalism, South Korea is increasingly becoming a society of amoral nationalists in which refugees of kindred blood not only struggle to resettle, but a growing number of double defectors are returning to their old lives in the North (Korea Hana Foundation, 2014). Under such

conditions, the already existing suspicion, distrust, and lack of social capital amongst North Koreans will only become more pronounced as we draw closer to the day when these elements will matter most.

Appendix

Banfield's Predictive Hypothesis, Chapter 5, p.85.

In a society of amoral familists,

1. No one will further the interest of the group or community except as it is to his private advantage to do so. People only seek their own welfare and wellbeing.
2. Only officials will concern themselves with public affairs, for only they are paid to do so. For a private citizen to take a serious interest in a public problem will be regarded as abnormal and even improper.
3. There will be few checks on officials, for checking on officials will be the business of other officials only.
4. Organization (i.e., deliberately concerted action) will be very difficult to achieve and maintain [because] the inducements which lead people to contribute their activity to organizations are to an important degree unselfish (e.g., identification with the purpose of the organization) and they are often non-material (e.g., the intrinsic interest of the activity as a "game").
5. Office-holders, feeling no identification with the purposes of the organization, will not work harder than is necessary to keep their places or (if such is within the realm of possibility) to earn promotion. Similarly, professional people and educated people generally will lack a sense of mission or calling. Indeed, official positions and special training will be regarded by their possessors as weapons to be used against others for private advantage.
6. The law will be disregarded when there is no reason to fear punishment. Therefore, individuals will not enter into agreements which depend upon legal processes for their enforcement unless it is likely that the law will be enforced and unless the cost of securing enforcement will not be so great as to make the undertaking unprofitable. It is taken for granted that all those who can cheat on taxes will do so. Minimum wage laws and laws which require the employer to make social security payments on the wages of

domestic servants are universally ignored.

7. Who is an office holder will take bribes when he can get away with it. But whether he takes bribes or not, it will be assumed by the society of amoral familists that he does.
8. In a society of amoral familists the weak will favor a regime which will maintain order with a strong hand.
9. The claim of any person or institution to be inspired by zeal for public rather than private advantage will be regarded as fraud.
10. There will be no connection between abstract political principle and concrete behavior in the ordinary relationships of everyday life.
11. There will be no leaders and no followers. No one will take the initiative in outlining a course of action and persuading others to embark upon it (except as it may be to his private advantage to do so) and, if one did offer leadership, the group would refuse it out of distrust.
12. The amoral familist will use his ballot to secure the greatest material gain in the short run. Although he may have decided views as to his long-run interest, his class interest, or the public interest, these will not affect his vote if the family's short-run, material advantage is in any way involved.
13. The amoral familist will value gains accruing to the community only insofar as he and his family are likely to share them. In fact, he will vote against measures which will help the community without helping him because, even though his position is unchanged in absolute terms, he considers himself worse off if his neighbors' position changes for the better. Thus it may happen that measures which are of decided general benefit will provoke a protest vote from those who feel that they have not shared in them or have not shared in them sufficiently.
14. The voter will place little confidence in the promises of the parties. He will be apt to use his ballot to pay for favors already received (assuming, of course, that more are in prospect) rather than for favors which are merely promised.
15. It will be assumed that whatever group is in power is self–serving and corrupt. Hardly will an election be over before the voters will conclude that the new officials are enriching themselves at their expense and that they have no intention of keeping the promises they

have made.

16. Despite the willingness of voters to sell their votes, there will be no strong or stable political machines in a society of amoral familists. This will be true for at least three reasons: a) the ballot being secret, the amoral voter cannot be depended upon to vote as he has been paid to vote; b) there will not be enough short-run material gain from a machine to attract investment in it, and c) for reasons explained above, it will be difficult to maintain formal organization of any kind whatever.
17. Party workers will sell their service to the highest bidders. Their tendency to change sides will make for sudden shifts in strength of the parties at the polls.

Bibliography

1. Alesina, Alberto. Giuliano, Paola. 2011. *Family Ties and Political Participation.* Journal of the European Economic Association. Oct2011, Vol. 9 Issue 5, p817-839. 23p.
2. Andrusz, Gregory D., Michael Harloe, and Iván Szelényi, eds. 1996. *Cities after Socialism: Urban and Regional Change and Conflict in Post-Socialist Societies*. Oxford ; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
3. Aum, Frank, and United States Institute of Peace. 2017. *North Korea and the Need for a US-ROK-PRC Dialogue*. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR412-North-Korea-and-the-Need-for-United-States-Rrepublic-Of-Korea-Peoples-Republic-of-China-Dialogue.pdf.
4. Banfield, Edward C. 1958. *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. 1. Freepress paperback ed. New York: The Free Press.
5. Bennett, Bruce. 2013. *Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean Collapse.* Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
6. Boissevain, Jeremy. 2013. *Factions, Friends and Feasts: Anthropological Perspectives on the Mediterranean*. New York: Berghahn Books.
7. CRS. 2007. North Korean refugees in China and human rights issues: International response and US policy options. Congressional Research Service. http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA473619
8. Daejoong Lee and Yongseok Seo, Alternative Futures for North Korea Economy: From the North Korean Perspectives, *Futures*, 10.1016/j.futures.2019.102455, (102455), (2019).
9. Davis, J. "Morals and Backwardness." Comparative Studies in Society and History 12, no. 3 (1970): 340-53. www.jstor.org/stable/178243.
10. Eberstadt, Nick, and Judith Banister. 1992. *The Population of North Korea*. Korea Research Monograph 17. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Center for Korean Studies.
11. Foster-Carter, Aidan. 2009. Review of *Reconstituting Korean Security: A Policy Primer*, by Hazel Smith. Pacific Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 3
12. Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*. New York: Free Press.
13. Hanifan, L. J. 1916. The Rural School Community Center. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 67, 130-138.

14. Hyun-Young Shin, Haewon Lee and Sang Min Park. 2016. Mental Health and Its Associated Factors Among North Korean Defectors Living in South Korea, *Asia Pacific Journal of Public Health*, 10.1177/1010539516660192, 28, 7, (592-600).

15. Krygier, Martin, and Adam W Czarnota. 2017. *The Rule of Law after Communism: Problems and Prospects in East-Central Europe*.

16. Lee, Suk. n.d. "Food Shortages And, Economic Institutions in The Democratic People's Republic of Korea," 420.

17. Natsios, Andrew S. 2001. The Great North Korean Famine. Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press.

18. Noh, J. W., Kwon, Y. D., Yu, S., Park, H., & Woo, J. M. 2015. *A study of mental health literacy among North Korean refugees in South Korea.* Journal of preventive medicine and public health = Yebang Uihakhoe chi, 48(1), 62–71.

19. Park, Hun Joo. 2014. *Recasting the North Korean Problem: Towards Critically Rethinking About the Perennial Crisis of the Amoral Family State and How to Resolve it*. KDI School of Pub Policy & Management Paper No. 14-10.

20. Popkin, Samuel L. 1979. *The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

21. Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti. 1994. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. 5. print., 1. Princeton paperback print. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.

22. Robertson, Jeffrey. 2019. *Is Pyongyang Different in Washington and Seoul? English and Korean Language Policy Discourse on North Korea.* Korea Economic Institute of America, Academic Paper Series, April.

23. Robertson, Jeffrey. 2009. *North Korea and Non-traditional Security Challenges.* Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security Section, 20 July. Research Paper no. 2 2009–10.

24. Scarlatoiu, Greg, 2015, 'Human Security in North Korea', International Journal of Korean Studies, vol. XIX, pp.125–161.

25. Smith, Hazel. 2016. "Nutrition and Health in North Korea: What's New, What's Changed and Why It Matters." *North Korean Review* 12 (1): 7–34.

26. Tatur, Melanie. 2004. *The Making of Regions in Post-Socialist Europe - the Impact of Culture, Economic Structure and Institutions: Case Studies from Poland, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine Volume I*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-80923-0.

27. UNDP, ed. 1994. *Human Development Report 1994*. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.

28. Weber, Max. 2013. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. United States: Merchant Books.

29. Lee, Yeeun. Lee, Minji. Park, Subin. 2017. *Mental health status of North Korean refugees in South Korea and risk and protective factors: a 10-year review of the literature*, European Journal of Psychotraumatology.